COLOMBIA COFFEE SECTOR STUDY

Document of
The World Bank

COLOMBIA

COFFEE SECTOR STUDY

2002

ESW prepared for Dept. of Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development
Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela Country Management Unit
Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office

Colombia Coffee Sector

Acknowledgment

This document has been prepared by a diverse team of consultants under the leadership of The
World Bank. Daniele Giovannucci coordinated the study and served as author and editor. The
other principal authors and contributors were José Leibovich, Diego Pizano, Gonzalo Paredes,
Santiago Montenegro, Hector Arévalo and Panos Varangis. The World Bank and the authors
would like to especially acknowledge a group of professionals working with the National
Federation of Coffee Growers, made up of Ana María Barrera, Gustavo Esguerra, Julián García,
Andrea Ospina y Clara Cecilia Vergara, and under the coordination of Diego Pizano who also
provided information and valuable background sections. Thanks also is due to Nestor Osorio,
Juan Jose Echavarría and Bryan Lewin for their comments and contribution.

A great debt of thanks is due to The National Federation of Coffee Growers, particularly Jorge.
Cardenas, Luis Fernando Samper and the management team for generously sharing their
excellent research and especially for their laudable willingness to openly discuss their strengths
and weaknesses during a difficult period of transition.

Thank you to the distinguished members of the Comisión de Ajuste de la Institucionalidad
Cafetera and their team for their frank discussion on this complex theme.

Finally, in the World Bank Adolfo Brizzi, Matthew McMahon and Panos Varangis managed the
study and contributed useful insights along with Carlos Felipe Jaramillo, and Elsie Garfield.
Mark Cackler helped to initiate and support the sector studies. The country management team
provided invaluable support led by Olivier Lafourcade, Alberto Chueca Mora, Marcelo Giugale,
and an excellent team in the Bogotá office.

The findings, interpretations, and conclusions of the study are those of the individual
contributors and do not necessarily reflect those of the World Bank, Colombian government, or
the National Federation of Coffee Growers.

Suggested citation: Giovannucci, Daniele, José Leibovich, Diego Pizano, Gonzalo
Paredes, Santiago Montenegro, Hector Arévalo and Panos Varangis. 2002.
Colombia Coffee Sector Study. Report No. 24600-CO. World Bank.

1

Table of Contents
ACRONYMS ....................................................................................................................... 4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................ 5
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 11
Historical Perspectives ........................................................................................................ 12
Coffee Cultivation, Harvesting and Processing in Colombia.............................................. 13
Global Context and Trends ................................................................................................. 14
Support and Stabilization Schemes...................................................................................... 14
Global Production and Demand Trends............................................................................... 15
Industry Concentration......................................................................................................... 18
Macro Trends in Established Consumer Markets................................................................ 18
Differentiated Markets ......................................................................................................... 20
2. COFFEE’S ECONOMIC IMPACT....................................................................................... 21
3. SOCIAL IMPACTS OF COFFEE ........................................................................................ 23
4. PRODUCTION ISSUES ................................................................................................... 26
Planting materials................................................................................................................. 28
Fertilizers ............................................................................................................................. 28
Productivity.......................................................................................................................... 28
Production quality................................................................................................................ 31
5. PRODUCTION SYSTEMS COSTS .................................................................................... 31
The more viable production schemes.................................................................................. 36
6. POST HARVEST PROCESSES ......................................................................................... 38
Post-harvesting infrastructure and its impact on quality..................................................... 38
Ecological management of byproduct and waste ................................................................ 39
7. MARKETING ................................................................................................................ 40
Internal Market Channels .................................................................................................... 40
Costs of marketing .............................................................................................................. 41
Pricing efficiencies .............................................................................................................. 44
Farmers % of FOB market price.......................................................................................... 44
Quality controls ................................................................................................................... 44
Size and realistic growth of potential domestic market ...................................................... 45
The International Marketing Chain ..................................................................................... 46
Promotional Program .......................................................................................................... 47
Capturing added value in the commercialization chain ...................................................... 49
Differentiated Markets ........................................................................................................ 50
Colombia’s Efforts to Develop Differentiated Coffees ....................................................... 51
Options to Capture Value .................................................................................................... 53
8. THE INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR ROLES ............................................................................ 54
Research and development .................................................................................................. 59
National Sectoral Leadership .............................................................................................. 60


Local and Regional Institutions........................................................................................... 61
9. FINANCING AND CREDIT: THE UNSOLVED CRISIS ............................................................. 62
10. RISK MANAGEMENT AND SAFETY NETS .................................................................... 64
11. COFFEE POLICIES ................................................................................................. 70
Exchange Rate..................................................................................................................... 70
Stabilization policies ........................................................................................................... 70
Taxes ................................................................................................................................... 73
Subsidies.............................................................................................................................. 74
- FUTURE OPTIONS ........................................................................................................ 75
12. INTEGRATION W ITH THE PROCESS OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT ................................... 76
13. MANAGING TRANSITIONS: OPTIONS FOR DIVERSIFICATION ......................................... 77
The Government’s Role in Diversification ......................................................................... 79
Past Experiences in Diversification..................................................................................... 81
Diversification’s Profile for the Future ............................................................................... 82
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................. 84
ANNEX 1. COLOMBIA’S COFFEE SUB-SECTOR PUBLIC SUPPORTS ....................................... 88
ANNEX II. NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF DIFFERENTIATED COFFEE MARKETS ............. 89

Currency Equivalents
US$1 = 2,300 Pesos Colombianos (2001)

Weights And Measures
1 hectare (ha) = 10,000 m2 = 2.47 acres
1 quintal (qq) = 100 pounds = 46 kg
1 metric ton (ton) = 2,205 pounds
1 bag of coffee = 60 kg = 132.3 lbs

3


Acronyms

ACPC Association of Coffee Producing Countries
ALMACAFE Almacenes Generales de Depósito de Café S.A.(warehousing)
CABI Commonwealth Agriculture Bureau International
CAIC Comisión de Ajuste de la Institucionalidad Cafetera
CENICAFE Colombian Coffee Investigation (Research) Center
CIAT Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical
CORDICAFE Corporación para la Diversificación Cafetera
CRECE Centro Regional de Estudios Cafeteros y Empresariales
DANE Departamento Nacional de Estadísticas (Statistics Department)
DCC Departamental Coffee Committees
DNP Departamento Nacional de Planeación (Planning Department)
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GIO Geographic Indications of Origin
GMO Genetically Modified Organism
HACCP Hazards Analysis at Critical Control Points
ICA International Coffee Agreement
ISO International Standards Organization
MCC Municipal Coffee Committees
MRL Maximum Residue Levels
FNC National Coffee Fund
NFCG National Federation of Coffee Growers
NYBOT New York Board of Trade
RMD Risk Management Division of the NFCG
SCAA Specialty Coffee Association of America
SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises
SPS/TBT Sanitary and Phytosanitary/Technical Barriers to Trade
WTO World Trade Organization

4


Executive Summary

Colombia is the world's third-largest producer of coffee and by far the largest single producer of
washed arabica coffee. Since serious commercial production began there in the 1870s it has
slowly developed a sterling reputation for consistency and good business practices. Coffee has
long been identified with Colombia. Indeed, coffee has for many decades shaped Colombia's
fortunes. Its value at one point reached 80% of Colombia's total export value. It was
instrumental in fostering much of the country's industrial development and many of its important
industries today were funded by coffee earnings.
Today coffee plays a much smaller economic role but it's social role has hardly diminished.
Coffee has privately funded many of the public development projects in the coffee growing
regions. It is a primary source of income for nearly a half-million rural families. It is also a
source of pride and independence. Its non-perishability and cash value make it the most
important crop in the highland areas. In some of these regions with proximity to areas of illicit
crop harvesting, the labor force that is normally well-employed in coffee production has been
attracted to this illicit alternative now that coffee prices and farm employment are at the lowest
levels in many decades. In 2001 the real value of the coffee harvest was only 40% of its average
throughout the 1990s.
Coffee’s importance, especially among the rural population, has made the current price crisis
particularly difficult for some of the poorer segments of Colombian society. There is urgent
concern that a prolonged crisis could seriously destabilize a number of rural areas.

In many rural areas, even for the potential producers of higher-value sustainable or differentiated
coffees1, only 40% have ready access to proper post-harvest processing facilities. Colombia has
pioneered a number of useful processes and methodologies including some that are very
environmentally friendly. It has been difficult, and more so during these times of crisis, to help
provide this infrastructure or even disseminate this information. Colombia’s productivity has
improved nearly 100% over the last 30 years but remained fairly constant, on average, during
much of the last decade. The late 1990s showed a worrying decline in this productivity that has
been turned around in the first two years of this decade.
Colombia has a sophisticated internal marketing system that operates through several distinct
channels and affords a grower considerable opportunities to complete a satisfactory transaction.
In many cases, though not always, he is not at the mercy of one buyer.

The evidence clearly indicates that marketing costs, as well as margins, vary significantly from
region to region and the farmer’s price appears to depend somewhat on the presence of coops in
his particular market to provide a competitive price.

1
Sustainable coffees include organic, fair trade, ecofriendly. Differentiated coffees encapsulated in these as well
as specialty, gourmet, and appellation (Geographic Indications of Origin). See Annex II for complete description.

5


The NFCG holds, as a primary responsibility the transference of a fair market price to coffee
growers and guaranteeing the purchase of all coffees offered so long as they comply with the
pre-determined quality standards. A common market practice by other purchasing agents and
exporters is to use the NFCG public price, which is announced daily, as a benchmark for
calculating their own prices. Therefore, under liberal market conditions, this mechanism helps
coffee growers negotiate a transparent price.

Farmers typically receive around 70-75% of the FOB price, when selling their coffee through the
coop system. This percentage may very significantly depending on the exporter and whether
intermediaries are used. This is one of the higher rates in the world.

The market has constantly paid a significant premium for the quality and consistency of
Colombia's coffee. Export cargos are fully sight and taste sampled thereby completing a series
of quality checks that occur throughout the supply chain. The national government has delegated
to the NFCG the determination of standards and consequently it has the power to stop any
shipment.

For the intermediaries, cooperatives, processors, and exporters who take title to this coffee, their
situation has changed somewhat since the National Coffee Fund (FNC) stopped its price
stabilization in 2001 and the NFCG had to alter the nature of its presence in the marketplace in
response to a significant reduction in its operating funds. As a result volatility in the internal
market has increased to the same level as world markets. This has increased the risk and
concomitantly the need for risk management instruments. The sector is well aware of the risks
of its trade and of the instruments available to mitigate it. Only small and medium farmers are
left without meaningful access to risk management instruments although in 1999 the NFCG
launched a Risk Management Department that could eventually help to provide such services to
the entire farming community. One useful model for this is the International Task Force on Price
Risk Management headquartered in the World Bank.

Increasing internal consumption, as Brazil did to become the world's No. 2 consumer, is one of
the options that can contribute to reducing the long-term impact of the coffee crisis.
Unfortunately Colombia's internal consumption has been declining. A number of factors have
contributed to this. Reduced consumer purchasing power that averaged 22% during the last
decade and changing breakfast habits are at the top of the list. Another problem may have been
the 19 years of subsidies for internal production that induced a strong negative response in terms
of both price and consumption when they were summarily withdrawn. Given the downturn in
other beverages as well, it may take more than promotional campaigns to foster consumption
growth.

Colombia's coffee growers have invested a half billion dollars on their promotional strategy over
the last 40 years. Their brand development and unified marketing are a positive byproduct of a
unified coffee industry and set them apart from all other producing countries. Not only has this
exposure improved the country's overall image but its trademarks and brands are also
internationally recognized as assets worth hundreds of millions of dollars.

6


Most analysts agree that these marketing approaches pioneered by the NFCG have been
unparalleled in the coffee world. However, there is concern that it may have somewhat lost
touch with the market's direction in recent years and failed to generate strategic
commercialization initiatives to address the current crisis. With only two exceptions, it has not
created opportunities for its brand to capture more existing value in downstream activities
especially after its heavy investment in its consumer branding.

While Colombian producers have consistently obtained a respectable premium over most other
mild coffee producers, prices for all producers have declined considerably. Conversely, coffee
firms in consuming nations have captured increasingly larger downstream margins. Increased
production driving down prices is certainly a major factor but so is the increasing concentration
and growing bargaining power of international coffee traders and roasters. At least one study
shows that while long-term green coffee producer prices have declined the retail price paid by
consumers has increased considerably. In changing world markets, Colombia must not only
address competition from other producers but also from other actors along the supply chain.
Managing its alliances and flexing of its market power will be critical for its future
competitiveness.

One reason for Colombia's market success in the past was its development of what could almost
be called a consistently high mono-quality. Its ability to provide high volumes at a steady
quality level gave it a unique advantage and a seemingly unassailable place in most large
commercial roasters’ blends. In recent years however other countries, producing not the same but
nevertheless adequate-quality coffees at lower prices, have taken some of its market share in
commercial blends. At the higher end of the market those producers who focused more on
differentiated offerings like Guatemala are currently earning higher premiums and are
establishing a first mover advantage in some of those markets.
Colombia has not been standing still, it has moved to improve its presence in supermarkets and
also invested in differentiated coffees. However its commitment to the latter has been relatively
small until recently. These incipient markets for differentiated coffees are of course still
relatively little but they are developing at a fast-pace and production for these could soon reach
about 15% of Colombia's total. They also earn considerably higher premiums, about 14% on
average last year. More importantly, it appears evident that Colombia's competitive advantage is
not to produce the lowest cost coffees for commercial blends. Its factors of production lend
themselves more to high-quality and differentiated offerings.
A number of these differentiated coffees have considerable benefits or externalities quite apart
from their market value. They can contribute to promoting more sustainable production
practices, to empowering farmers and their cooperatives, and to help foster a more rational use of
natural resources. They can also be a natural way to manage risk since they often do not require
considerable upfront investments or the expenditure of hard earned cash on imported
agrochemicals. Because of these factors and the market factors differentiated coffees can be one
of the important tools in Colombia's market strategy requiring that bottlenecks be resolved in its
production and post-harvest processes.

Throughout the decades when Colombia set the benchmark for quality and pioneered new
practices throughout the supply chain perhaps its most notable achievement is a sectoral

7


institution that has no parallel in the world: The National Federation of Coffee Growers (NFCG).
For more than 70 years it has helped coordinate national policy, improved cultivation practices
through its internationally renowned research institute, instituted and maintained the most
rigorous set of quality controls in the world, and built up perhaps the only commonly known
national coffee brand as exemplified by Juan Valdez and the "100% Colombian " logo. An even
more remarkable achievement is its willingness and ability to invest heavily for the public
benefit in coffee growing areas. It has built hundreds of clinics and hospitals, thousands of
schools, and funded numerous road and infrastructure projects. It's efforts have been
instrumental in achieving the superior levels of human development that currently exist in the
coffee growing areas. Yet all is not perfect.

A recent in-depth evaluation recognized its many merits and yet also offered some comments
about the need to restructure and reinvent the coffee institutions (FNC and NFCG) into more
lean and agile agencies with improved accountability and transparency. This will be critical in
order for them to effectively fulfill their three essential functions. Their distinct multiple
functions as market regulators, a market participant, and a market promoter cannot be credibly
mixed together as they have been without potentially incurring a number of problems that range
from inappropriate political influence to some inefficiency.
The National Coffee Fund (FNC) is Colombia's primary policy instrument and through its
National Coffee Committee determines policy. Originally it was created to stabilize the flows of
coffees in the early quota days (Convenio Interamericano de Cuotas 1940) and then evolved to
serve as a price stabilization mechanism for more than 20 years. It succeeded in significantly
reducing the internal price volatility and helping to manage the supply throughout most of its
existence. By the 1990s it experienced a precipitous decline and the recent crisis forced it to end
its stabilization functions, cut back much of its financing, and seek credit support.
The NFCG executes the policy determined by the National Coffee Committee but due to the
current inability of either the farmers or the FNC to make substantial contributions, it has been
forced to slash its expenditures. It has been able to maintain its most basic functions that include:
guaranteed purchase of the coffee produced (provided basic quality is met)
the provision of critical services such as research an storage facilities
quality control
sales and marketing overseas
The coffee ‘contribución’ or tax has been practically suspended due to low prices2 and there is
some debate about whether it should be reinstated and at what level. This debate is critical since
this income has traditionally funded coffee policy. A recent high-level report took up the debate
and noted that on occasion the government through the National Coffee committee pursued its
own macroeconomic policy goals and political priorities rather than the direct benefit of the
coffee growers. Through the FNC, coffee growers, rather than pocketing the money, appear to
have contributed an estimated $535 million to the national government in the last 17 years. No
other agricultural sector so heavily finances the government to help conduct its policy.

2
currently assessed at less than one cent US per pound

8


Most taxation recommendations agree on a maximum level that is considerably lower than in
previous years thereby intending to transfer a larger portion of the world price directly to
growers. Most importantly, there is a growing awareness of the need to foster transparency
around how the tax is determined and how it is spent.
One of the less visible and yet most important aspects of the work funded by the FNC is the
world-class research and development institution: CENICAFE. While this institution has made
some notable achievements, there is growing opinion that it could accomplish even more with its
accumulated inventory of basic research and production technology that could greatly benefit the
coffee sector on the whole, especially smallholders while its focus may have been more on the
high-tech and larger scale developments. It too is in need of more appropriate evaluation and
feedback mechanisms so that it can be more responsive to its constituents.
For many decades the issue of credit has been a priority for producers. Despite the overall
historic success of coffee, private financial institutions are not disposed to extending credit in
rural areas and to small producers. This situation is common to rural areas in all developing
countries. Even some of the specialized institutions set up to specifically serve the agrarian
sector have been unable to fulfill the demand. Informal credits helps to bridge some of the gap
but only at usurious rates of interest. Initiatives like the Productive Alliances Project, are
providing hopeful indications of alternative solutions at least in some areas. With the dramatic
downturn in prices many coffee producers have had to restructure their credit more than once.
At present there are two main subsidies that affect coffee production: A) a subsidy for the
renovation of coffee plantations and B) a price subsidy that guarantees a price support for coffee
production. There is concern about the targeting of the former since it is available to coffee
growers despite their size or means. Various experiences with price support schemes provide us
with the following lessons: a) maintaining higher prices in the face of long-term declining
markets is almost impossible and b) if support is deemed absolutely necessary, the better
approach is to support the income and/or the diversification of coffee farmers instead of
supporting prices.
A recent report that studied the costs of different types of production on different farm sizes and
in different regions concluded that low-cost production schemes are the ones more likely to
remain feasible in Colombia and that the Southern Region has the brightest future in coffee
production. Conversely, the Eastern Region, with the highest costs in all considered
technologies, could therefore be the most likely to diversify out of coffee if low prices continue.
Modern technologies with higher production yields per area, also incur higher input costs,
especially labor costs, which at the prevailing price levels are not offset by greater volumes of
production. Since less productive traditional technologies have lower cost structures, especially
labor costs, they seem to be better placed to survive under present circumstances. The studies
only looked at production costs and of course these are only one factor in determining
profitability. The generalized assessments are only for the purpose of understanding the overall
production potential in each region.
In coffee growing areas of there has been an increasing level of on-farm diversification over time
that is mainly the result of farmers’ initiatives. This implies a certain disposition to diversify.
Much of the diversification away from coffee has not included smallholders and occurred
primarily on larger landholdings suggesting difficulties for smallholders to diversify. Recent

9


studies have noted that favoring extensive, large scale agriculture “…continues the disturbing
trend of the past fifty years where the use of land and labor in Colombia has been driven in
highly inefficient directions by a variety of agriculture sector, land and rural financial policies
and sector programs…”3. There has been little diversification into cash crops that could help
balance the dependence on coffee. Although many crops, which are exclusively associated with
food security and smallholder agriculture, have remained stable.

Diversification is not easy, especially from a traditional and popular non-perishable cash crop
like coffee. A diversification program for coffee growing areas must start by addressing
particular farmer objectives defined according to local necessities (i.e. income diversification,
improved food safety, promote planting of other more profitable coffee varieties, or any
combination). It must also help farmers to assess specific issues related to appropriate
technology, risks, necessary skills, financing, information, and markets. Non-farm rural
enterprise4 presents another option.

The government has a key role to play in any diversification initiatives. It can provide vital
resources like technical assistance, credit, market research, and organizational skills. Colombia
has had considerable experience with diversification and many lessons can be learned from this.
One of the studies reviewing these experiences notes that the most successful diversification
enterprises were those initiated by the farmers themselves, as opposed to institutional programs.

Because of its organization and experience Colombia's coffee sector will survive the current
crisis relying on its unique ability to adapt and to innovate as it has before. A vision of a
sustainable coffee sector in Colombia will involve an expanded approach to quality, increased
focus on emerging environmental issues, more attention given to smallholders, and adding value
by improving processes and capturing more of the downstream margins in the supply chain. To
do so its institutions will evolve toward more agile and more transparent forms. They will know
that the answer is not just about quality or about specialty markets or about productivity or about
better promotional campaigns. It is about managing, like a business, all of its considerable
factors of competitiveness and doing so in an equitable manner that benefits all of the sector.

3
Drawing from Heath, John and Hans Binswanger. Natural Resource Degradation effects of poverty and population
growth are largely policy-induced: the case of Colombia.. Environment and Development Economics. World Bank.
Conveyed in personal communication from M. McMahon.
4
Many useful services from machine repair to accounting to equipment rental can provide valuable services that
support farm communities and make them more productive while reducing the inherent risk associated with farming.

10


1. Introduction

Colombia is one of the world's most important producers of coffee. The current crisis
dramatically affects not only its own situation but also that of the world's coffee markets. The
World Bank has undertaken this study in response to the government's and its own concern,
expressed at the highest levels. It intends to examine the current situation throughout the sector
and its impact at the social as well as the economic and environmental levels. This study is
complemented by a separate report that assesses the larger global situation in terms of the
dominant supplying countries and the evolution of demand.

This introduction outlines the global situation in brief and sets the context with a synopsis of
Colombia's coffee history and its unique "caficultura” . Chapters 2 and 3 assess the impact of the
current coffee situation in both economic and social terms. Chapters 4 and 5 address the current
situation and the relevant issues in its production and post-harvest processes. Chapters 6
assesses the marketing chain from the grower to the exporter and considers some of the
competitive options that are available. It also considers Colombia's domestic and international
promotions. Chapter 7 takes a look at the relevant institutions at the local, regional, and national
levels; it describes their roles and evolution and discusses issues relevant to their future.
Chapters 8 and 9 review the situation of credit and the risk management options that are
currently available. The policies currently selected by the government to resolve this crisis are
considered in chapter 10 and compared to the lessons learned in other countries. The current
production systems and their regional differences are considered in chapter 11 and some
conclusions drawn about the profitability of diverse production systems in different regions.
Chapter 12 discusses some of the options for the sector to capture more value for its products.
The last chapter reviews some of the rationale and the required parameters for any successful
diversification and reflects on the inherent challenges that a diversification efforts would present.

11


Historical Perspectives

Jesuit priests are credited with having first introduced coffee into Colombia around 1723.
Colombia’s long history as a commercial coffee producer and exporter only began in the 1870s.
At the end of the nineteenth century, production was primarily concentrated in the department of
North Santander (in eastern Colombia). At the beginning of the twentieth century, its growth
spread with the consolidation of settlements in Antioquia and coffee became the main crop in
these new areas. By around 1910 its production and exports topped one million pounds and
coffee accounted for about half of Colombia's export revenue. Caldas and Antioquia soon
consolidated their current position as the country's main coffee growing departments. Coffee
activity now occurs in 604 of the nation's 1,022 municipalities.

For decades it helped to provide the foreign income that fueled the growth of many other
productive and industrial sectors. By 1920 Colombia was exporting 2.3 million bags valued at
US$106 million. By then, coffee was so vital to the economy that it represented approximately
65% of Colombia’s total exports. Later in the decade this percentage climbed even higher to
80%. Its considerable capacity to generate employment was perhaps more valuable than its
foreign exchange earnings. This employment and subsequent cash flow fueled a new level of
purchasing power among many segments of the population. This new demand therefore became
an essential element in the growth of banks, railways, and many firms in the industrial sector.

One hundred and twenty years later, Colombia has benefited from its coffee history and it has
diversified and considerably strengthened its economic position. While coffee may not be as
economically important to Colombia as it was in the past, it is still vital. Not only is it important
for Colombia but for the world as well. Colombia’s share of the international market went from
10.6 percent during the first half of the 1970s, to 15.2 percent in the first half of the 1990s,
falling to 11 percent during the last two years (Clavijo, Jaramillo, and Leibovich, 1994; Pizano,
2001). Colombia is now the world's third-largest coffee exporter with 10 million bags in 20015
representing foreign exchange earnings of US$ 893 million.

Colombia's population estimate for 2001 is just over 40 million people. It's per capita GDP
purchasing power parity is approximately $6,200 yet more than 50% of its population is below
the poverty line. Colombia's coffee story is more than economics, it is inextricably entwined with
its culture, its development, and even its identity. Colombia has 805,000 hectares of coffee
fields, with farms averaging 1.4 hectares per farmer. Yet, Colombia does not have a homogenous
coffee sector, it is comprised of considerable diversity. It is this very complexity that provides
many of the seeds of its future competitive success. This very diversity is a valuable asset as it
strives to revitalize its coffee culture and continues its valuable contributions to nearly three
million people that depend on coffee.

5
9,974,000 60 kg bags

12


Coffee Cultivation, Harvesting and Processing in Colombia6

Colombian coffee is grown in mountainous regions at altitudes ranging from 1,000 to 2,100
meters, where the average temperature is between 18 and 22 degrees Celsius and rainfall is
frequent. Given the wide climatic and geographical differences, Colombia cannot be said to
have a specific coffee harvesting period, as is the case in many other coffee-producing countries.
Depending on the region, coffee is harvested throughout the year, with a principal crop between
October and December, and a secondary crop between April and May1. There are, however,
some regions in which the principal crop is harvested between April and May and the secondary
crop between October and December, thus allowing a more even flow of fresh coffee. In order to
guarantee good quality. The secondary crop is popularly known as the "Traviesa" or "Mitaca". A
tree can be visited up to eight occasions until all the ripe cherries have been picked at their
optimal stage of development.

In order to produce a final bag of green coffee (60 kg) the grower must harvest and process
approximately 450 kilos of fresh coffee cherries. After harvesting, the coffee undergoes a
preparation process which transforms the ripe cherries into parchment coffee ready for marketing
and industrial preparation. The coffee is prepared by the wet processing method. This means
that farms usually have access to preparation facilities that usually include the following:

Pulping: this process separates the pulp from the ripe cherries and is done by pulping machines
on the day the cherries are picked and thus differentiates them from “naturals”.

Fermentation: this process removes the remaining mucilaginous pulp covering the bean. The
coffee beans are placed in fermentation tanks and left to ferment for between 12 and 24 hours
depending on the local temperature. This operation may also be carried out using special
equipment; when mucilage-removing equipment is used, the process is carried out in a single
continuous operation.

Washing: after fermentation, the beans are washed in canals of running water in order to remove
the fermented mucilage.

Drying: the coffee is dried in the sun; on very large farms, mechanical driers are used. The
dried coffee is known as parchment coffee and is often sold in this form.

Once the coffee has been prepared by the grower, he sells his crop, which is then milled and
marketed. After milling and before final bagging, the coffee is classified by color, size and
shape; specialized equipment and female workers are employed for this purpose. Quality
control is then carried out by NFCG whose experts take samples of the various types of coffee.
These are roasted, ground and brewed, and coffee tasters classify the coffee in accordance with
its aroma, body (concentration), acidity and uniform quality characteristics.

6
Partly adapted from ICO Colombia profile

13


Global Context and Trends

The coffee industry is undergoing some fundamental changes in the nature of the business, and it
is important to recognize the extent and consequences of the emerging paradigm shift.7 These
include:

• Dramatic increases in tree plantings that now practically ensure structural long-term
overproduction potential, particularly in unwashed arabicas and robusta.
• The quality of these less-expensive coffees is steadily improving.
• The ability and willingness to substitute traditional coffee origins in most industrial
blends.
• Increased concentration, especially among roasters and traders, which reduces market
options.
• Market concentration, inadequate information, and speculation will likely fuel continued
high volatility in the absence of an international agreement.
• Lower green beans prices no longer necessarily correlate with lower roaster and retail
prices that would usually stimulate increased consumption.

Support and Stabilization Schemes

In the past there have been several international attempts to stabilize world coffee prices through
the International Coffee Agreement (ICA). The ICA succeeded in keeping coffee prices higher
and stable, although price stabilization benefited mostly exporting countries with established
higher quotas, and penalized new entrants (Akiyama and Varangis 1990). Since 1989, the ICA
has not included economic clauses that would regulate the coffee market, resulting in greater
world price volatility and overall lower prices during the 1990s. From 1993 until its recent
demise, a producers’ organization, the Association of Coffee Producing Countries, tried but
failed to regulate the world coffee supply through a retention scheme.

In addition to international efforts, several coffee-producing countries (including Cameroon,
Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire, and Papua New Guinea) have used price stabilization funds. Almost
all of these stabilization funds ran into serious financial difficulties. In most cases, the funds
eventually went bankrupt. While it lasted, Columbia’s was certainly the most successful, but its
net worth has dramatically decreased and it can no longer perform its stabilization function.

During the 1990s, several coffee-producing countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala) tried
to support domestic prices.8 Mexico and Nicaragua used funds differently to support the income

7
A considerably more in-depth treatment of this topic occurs in the companion document, “Global Supply and
Demand: New Paradigms in the Coffee Market.”

14


of small coffee producers by giving a fixed payment per hectare with caps on maximum farm
size rather than production quantity. More recently, Guatemala is using a fund to promote
diversification, agroprocessing, marketing, and debt restructuring. The various experiences with
price support schemes and stabilization funds provide us with the following lessons:

• Most price stabilization schemes aim to support domestic prices when world prices
decline. The objective of higher prices rather than stable prices is almost impossible to
maintain (Wright and Williams 1990; Deaton 1992; McIntire and Varangis 1999).
• If support is deemed absolutely necessary, the better approach is to support the income
and/or the diversification of coffee farmers instead of supporting prices. Mexico and
Nicaragua, for example, have provided a support linked to amount of hectares under
coffee so that there is less distortionary incentive to increase production in order to
receive more.
• Any price support scheme that maintains a higher price level removes the realistic
incentives for necessary adjustments in terms of diversification and reducing
production in marginal areas.

Global Production and Demand Trends

In the last 20 years, world production has increased from 86 million bags to about 122 million
bags today (USDA 2002), giving rise to surpluses on the order of 10 million bags in 2002, and
more in 2003. For the near to mid-term, most predict that price recovery will be slow.
Production may drop below demand by 2003/04, but significant accumulated stocks will remain
a negative influence on prices.

When looking for an answer to coffee’s dismal prices, most fingers point first to Vietnam, whose
dramatic 1,400 percent robusta production increase in a decade (1990–2000) appears to have
surprised the industry. While Vietnam’s meteoric rise to number 2 producer, with 14.7 million
bags in the 2000/2001 year, makes it the most visible contributor to overproduction, it is by no
means the only one (see Figure 1). Brazil, for example, has added more to the global supply
over the last five years than Vietnam has (Giovannucci 2002), and its production increase in this
year alone (about 13 million bags) exceeds Vietnam’s total output for this year. Also of note is
that since the 1997 low point for consumer stocks, the stocks of arabicas (particularly Other
Milds) have been growing faster than robustas. Consumer stocks of Colombian coffee fell
sharply in 1995 to about one month’s supply, where they have remained since. This, along with
reduced Colombian stocks, may have contributed to raised differentials in relation to the Other
Milds, as can be seen in Figure A1. However, recently that premium has been lost as the prices
of other good-quality washed arabicas have risen as production of washed arabicas has fallen.

8
Costa Rica’s National Fund for Coffee Stabilization (FONECAFE) paid farmers $6.38 per quintal during 1998–99
and 1999–2000, and $18.76 per quintal during 2000–01, with the obligation of a repayment by farmers if world
prices increase above $92 per quintal. Similar efforts by El Salvador and Guatemala were all funded through the
issuance of bonds.

15


Figure A1. Differentials—Colombia and Other Milds

40.00

35.00

30.00

25.00

20.00

Average
15.00

10.00

5.00

0.00
Jan-90 Jul-90Jan-91 Jul-91Jan-92 Jul-92Jan-93 Jul-93Jan-94 Jul-94Jan-95 Jul-95Jan-96 Jul-96Jan-97 Jul-97Jan-98 Jul-98Jan-99 Jul-99Jan-00 Jul-00Jan-01 Jul-01Jan-02

Source: Lewin, World Bank

Brazil produced a bumper crop in 1998/99 of about 38 million bags from about 3.4 billion trees.
Recent estimates suggest there are approximately 4.6 billion trees now in production, with about
1.3 billion more still developing. Of these 6 billion trees, many new ones went into northern
frost-free zones and the highly productive areas of the Cerrado (Giovannucci 2002). Brazilian
cooperatives in Sol do Minas are now introducing washed coffees, and perceive a production
capability of about 2 million bags. The quality of the unwashed and semiwashed coffees has
improved, and is now able to take a much larger part of commercial blends than before,
displacing other washed coffees and even robustas according to relative prices (see Figure A2).

16


Figure A2.

Importer Demand for Exportable Production
45%

40%

35%

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%
89/90 90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00 00/01 01/02
Colombian Milds other Naturals Robustas

Source: World Bank ITF

Until the arrival of the 2002/03 Brazil crop, the most notable increase has been in robustas,
where Brazil, India, and Vietnam, particularly, have seen substantial increases. Exportable
robusta production now accounts for over 40 percent of import demand, which historically has
not been much more than 33 percent.

This increased capacity has strong implications for future supply. Historians would note that this
boom–bust cycle has plagued the industry for more than a century, including Colombia’s own,
although more modest, 50-percent-plus production increases in the 1970s. Indeed, it is not just
coffee that suffers this cycle; it is almost an a priori definition of commodities. The availability
of these coffees and flexible usage patterns have come following a period in which high
volatility and high prices forced coffee roasters in importing countries to make a number of
changes in their business, and this is another key part of the paradigm shift.

Through the use of new technologies, industry has been able to lower its necessary working
stock levels and has also been able to introduce more flexibility into its blending—by, for
example, steaming robustas and some low-grade arabicas to reduce their harsh taste. Analysis of
imports from Colombia and other washed arabica producers into countries such as Germany
suggests that roasters are finding replacements for the average quality output from Colombia. It
is not clear whether they would switch back if Colombian output rebounded above recent levels.
This implies that Colombia must be savvy about its strategies in these markets.

17


Conceptually, the overall market can be perceived as a quality pyramid with inexpensive soluble
coffee at the bottom, standard commercial blends in the middle, and progressing toward high-end
differentiated coffee at the top. While the top and bottom are growing at a healthy pace, the vast
middle section has been stagnant. Colombia’s general position is primarily in this middle tier,
and therefore finding sustainable future growth presents a challenge.

Industry Concentration
The fact that technology has led roasters to become more flexible in their approach to blending
has increased the requirements of agile just-in-time logistical capabilities of suppliers, which has
consequently favored the largest trading companies, leading to concentration of the supply chain
in fewer major traders. The shortening of the trade chain and the loss of some market players
has also led to a concentration of the marketing margins in the hands of the more powerful
players. Today, retailers, with their ability to manage consumer information and prices, are in
the driver’s seat. Their ability to develop private labels and otherwise bypass the traditional
trading channels is fast emerging as a critical issue. Only the more organized producer groups
will have the capacity to deal with them directly.

Globally, the food industry is consolidating at every level. While this trend increases efficiency,
it also reduces the leverage of producers and makes it increasingly difficult for smallholders and
small and medium-size enterprises to participate in the markets. As the dominant players
downstream in the supply chain capture
more value and enforce exclusivity on
their suppliers in order to maximize Table 1A. The Increasing Concentration of
profits, increase entry barriers, and the International Coffee Business
mitigate risk (that is, food safety,
market risk, financial), they are fast • 5 traders dominate 48%
emerging as the dominant form of • 5 importers manage 46%
competition. To be competitive today, • 5 roasters control 55%
producers need to address supply-chain
development at every level so that they Source: Pizano, 2001
add value to agricultural products as
they require individual participants to coordinate their activities in a continuous improvement
process.

A declining share of earnings is further aggravating the dire situation of Colombia and other
producer countries. In the 1980s consumers spent approximately $30 billion per year on coffee,
and producing countries earned approximately $9 billion, or nearly 30 percent of this. Today
consumers spend an average of $55 billion a year on coffee, and producing countries earn
approximately $6 billion, or 11 percent of this (Gemeil 2001).

Macro Trends in Established Consumer Markets
If, indeed, consolidation is now a dominant competitive paradigm, other options are fast
emerging for smaller producers and enterprises to exploit channels that large supply chains and
mega-enterprises find less cost-effective than mass production. One such channel is

18


differentiation, where producers can develop a competitive advantage that is not easily affected
by generic competitive factors (price, distribution, and so forth) that dominant actors often
command.

Quality and value will continue their emergence as competitive standards with continued,
although more modest, prosperity in the European Union (EU) and in the United States, where
postwar baby boomers will drive growing demand for “highly targeted and specialized products”
(Food Distribution Magazine 2001), and mass market brands are particularly vulnerable to
intense competition. This is supported by industry research pointing out that individualized
tastes of the percentage of the U.S. population consuming gourmet coffee9 has grown
considerably in recent years, from 31 percent to 46 percent.

According to the U.S. National Coffee Association, coffee-drinking habits are elastic among
consumers under age 35. After age 35, the proportion of people who convert from non-coffee
drinkers to regular coffee drinkers is low, suggesting that in relatively mature markets like the
United States, the coffee industry will have to capture more young people as they enter
adulthood.

Another area of strong growth is the market for soluble coffee. This is growing at the high end
for more mature markets and among the most basic quality levels in the emerging markets. Some
of the high-end markets such as the United Kingdom use a considerable proportion of arabica
beans in their soluble offerings.

Increasing food safety concerns (mycotoxins, bovine spongiform encephalopathy [BSE, or “mad
cow” disease], hoof and mouth disease, genetically modified organisms) stimulate strong market
responses. This implies a fundamental shift in the role of grades and standards from reducing
transaction costs to serving as strategic tools for market penetration, system coordination, quality
and safety assurance, and product niche definition. These are being driven by three sets of
changes in the global trade regime:

1. A new regulatory environment, with the World Trade Organization and its Sanitary and
Phytosanitary/Technical Barriers to Trade agreements, regional trade agreements, and
even governmental requirements (EU standards for ochratoxin, maximum residue levels,
and so forth) make entry into fast-globalizing markets more demanding than ever for
products across the agricultural spectrum.

2. A new business environment features increased legal liability and requires “due
diligence,” such as the international standards organization and hazards analysis at
critical control points, that are some of the institutional methods of standardizing. Supply
chain concentration also demands ever-increasing levels of standards and performance
measured by global rather than local performance standards. Individual firms and chains
(supermarket, fast food, and so forth) are increasingly creating their own standards that

9
Defined as “premium whole bean or ground varieties” in the 2001 “National Coffee Drinking Trends Study,” The
National Coffee Association, New York.

19


they impose on the agrifood chains that they dominate in developing countries (the
Ethical Trade Initiative and Euro Retailer Produce Working Group).

3. There is a new consumer environment that features increased food safety concerns, a
focus on health and diet, and increasingly globalized consumer tastes. In more developed
markets, experts predict that social and environmental concerns, especially ethical ones
will continue to emerge as not only competitive differentiators but as basic rules of the
game and prerequisites for participation.

Coffee sales are affected by these concerns even if coffee is not directly affected. There is great
interest in the economic, social, and environmental benefits of differentiated and specialty
coffees and their volumes have grown dramatically in recent years. The markets for these
products should be approached with caution since they are still limited and can involve
considerable farmer effort to adapt to their more stringent requirements. However, their
development often provides additional benefits or externalities beyond competitive advantage;
that is, improved natural resource management, community or organizational development, and
increased rural self-sufficiency.

Differentiated Markets
Some leading buyers are either implementing or considering sustainable sourcing guidelines that
differentiate them from other sources of supply, and may push the demand for coffees like
organics that fit these criteria. The differentiated markets, led by continued strong growth in the
United States that is now spilling over into Europe and parts of Asia, offer excellent
circumscribed opportunities for higher-quality producers, although volumes in most of these
markets are still very modest.

The differentiated markets could be one valuable tool with which to earn higher revenues and a
superior market reputation. In the case of Colombia, these can serve as valuable levers to help it
benefit from its quality-oriented competitive advantage. These markets can and often do overlap
each other. They include:
• Geographic Indications of Origin
• Gourmet and specialty
• Organic
• Fair trade
• Ecofriendly or shade grown.

A discussion of their primary characteristics and their current trends is presented in Annex II.
The reasons for their importance as part of a strategy include: a) Consistent high growth rates; b)
Price premiums; c) They can address global social and environmental concerns; d) The need to
access market niches that are competitively different; and e) The opportunity to provide positive
externalities in the field.

20


2. Coffee’s Economic Impact

For decades, coffee was the single most important sector of the Colombian economy. Through
the mid 1980s, coffee policy was synonymous with macroeconomic policy. Since then, coffee’s
relative macroeconomic importance began to decline. This tendency was the result of a
deliberate diversification policy of sources of income and foreign exchange. (See Chart 1).

Chart 1
Major Sectors’ Share of Total Exports
%

56.8
60
52.2
50
39.9 38.6
40

30

20
7.2 6.1
10

Coffee Petroleum, carbon, steel Non-traditionals

70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 95-99 00-01

Thanks to its diversification the coffee sector crisis has not produced a serious balance of
payments problem and neither has it become a generalized crisis of the whole economy. In
effect, as it is shown in Charts 2 and 3 participation of the coffee sector has decreased from
around 30% of agricultural GDP in the middle of the 1970s, to less than 24% at the end of the
decade, and from nearly 3% of total GDP to less than 2% during that same period.

Chart 2 Chart 3
Coffee’s share in Agriculture Coffee’s share in total GDP
(%)
2.8
30.1 29.6 2.8
30
(A verage) 2.5 (Average)
28 2.4

26
23.9 2.0
24
1.7

22 1.6
75-84 85-95 95-99 75-84 85-95 95-99

21


While it is evident that the behavior of world coffee prices is volatile, and that during the
twentieth century coffee prices reached extraordinarily high peaks (1954 and 1977), in real terms
its long term trend has been a decreasing one. In effect the price of mild coffees is the lowest in
history. Producers who can deal profitably with situations such as these are those who can offset
low prices with greater productivity, lower costs of production or product differentiation
strategies, in order to sell their output at greater prices than the average

800

700 Chart 4
International Coffee's Price,
600 Us$ct /pound in constant terms
(2001)
500

400

300

200

100

-
1913

1919

1925

1931

1937

1943

1949

1955

1961

1967

1973

1979

1985

1991

1997

Source: ICO and author calculations

.

22


3. Social Impacts of Coffee

Coffee today does not only derive its importance from being one of Colombia’s main exports,
but also because fully 18% of Colombia’s rural households depend on it directly for their
income. According to the Encuesta Nacional Cafetera in 1997, Colombia’s coffee zone had
566,230 coffee farms with a total of 423,368 households living on them.

The coffee sector has made considerable public investments in its growing regions. It has in
many cases made an impact superior to even that of the national government. Levels of illiteracy
are notably lower than the national average. On average, 80% of households have local primary
schools. With government support The NFCG has constructed more than 6000 schools that can
teach approximately 360,000 children.

In coffee growing regions there is greater availability of a clean drinking water, utilities and
basic sanitation. Even health services are better and have greater coverage than in non-coffee
producing areas. The NFCG, investing resources provided by the coffee tax built 180 hospitals
and over 200 health clinics in the coffee growing regions. Unfortunately many of these advances
are unlikely to be continued given the difficult financial condition of the NFCG

It is of little consolation to know that the impacts of today’s historic price lows are not confined
to the coffee regions. Many commodities like coffee have experienced dramatic lows in recent
years and coffee price volatility has quadrupled in the last decade (less so domestically due to
price supports). Low prices and volatility impact the poorest segments of society most of all. In
Colombia, the inability or failure to diversify and/or add value has left commodity production as
the primary source of income for many thousands of poor families.

A coffee farmer audit finished in 2001 (Common Fund for Commodities et al., 2001) noted in
order of importance the main problems mentioned by small coffee farmers:

1. low coffee prices
2. lack of rural credit
3. commercialization problems
4. lack of community organization
5. low coffee productivity

The inability to reinvest in their farms or their productivity leads to many well-documented
problems including: rural migration, reduced education and healthcare, and even unsustainable
natural resource use with corresponding environmental problems. How best to manage the
negative consequences of fewer coffee commodity market options and volatile coffee markets
are key issues for Colombian farmers and the allied coffee industry. This need is particularly
pointed in light of emerging information that global shifts in production and consumption
patterns indicate that the depression of prices could be considerably longer than in the past.

23


As profitability in coffee production decreases, field cultivation practices which demand labor
and fertilizers decrease as well, affecting not only physical coffee quality but also its
organoleptic quality. This decrease in quality is manifesting itself already and in the future its
effect will only compound given the cyclical and slow developing nature of coffee trees.
Consequently, these current responses in the field to low prices will affect coffee quality several
years into the future and continue to jeopardize farm incomes even when the crisis passes.

The volatility of domestic producer prices, in
Coffee Prices Volatility Index turn, has increased significantly, as measured
(Standard Deviation %)
by volatility index, which rose from 10% in
Year World Price Producer Price 1995, to 32% in 2000, approaching the world
1995 35.52 9.69 price volatility index. See Table 1. In 2001
1996 39.75 19.76 the abandonment of stabilization policy
1997 65.12 40.13 floated the producer price to fully reflect
1998 36.56 25.40 world market prices.
1999 55.52 26.83
2000 47.86 32.07 The coffee production area has reduced 17%
Table 1. Source: NCFG or ca. 170,000 Ha. In the last decade
according to FAO data. According to the
Encuesta Nacional Cafetera (1997)10, since 1970 there has been an increase in the number of
coffee farms from 297,000 to 668,000, and a reduction in the coffee growing areas from 1.05
million to 870,000 hectares in 1997. This indicates a reduction in the average size of farms
whose primary crop is coffee from 14.8 to 5 hectares and in the average size of actual coffee
plots from 3.5 to 1.4 hectares11.

Distribution of Coffee Plots by size

Green Coffee
Size of Coffee Number of Total Coffee Area
plots (ha) Farms (ha.)
Production %
(60 kg. Bags)
0–1 364.300 167.000 1.811.880 15,10%
>1 – 5 172.200 373.000 4.857.552 40,48%
> 5 -10 20.100 138.000 2.011.632 16,76%
>10 – 20 6.900 93.500 1.561.140 13,01%
> 20 2.800 98.000 1.757.700 14,65%

Total 566.300 869.500 11.999.904 100%
Table 2. Source: Encuesta Nacional Cafetera 1997

There is no clear evidence yet that the coffee crisis has induced a widescale process of illicit crop
substitution in the coffee regions although several news stories and the National Federation of

10
this is the most current set of this data on the sector.
11
The current Agricultural Production Unit (APU) definition differs from the one used in 1970 of the farm; the
argument does not refer to APUs but to farms alone.

24


Coffee Growers (NFCG) reports indicate that it is happening sporadically and the possibility is
ominous12. But there are indications that the shortage of employment opportunities and rural
diversification options combine with the insecurity in many areas to form a self-feeding circle
that serves to limit productive long-term investment and results in greater dependence on illicit
crops and low-labor activities like livestock. Cocaine has helped produce a ‘Dutch disease’
effect, contributing to the appreciation of the peso and to higher real wages in the countryside.

In some of the coffee departments such as Huila, Tolima, Cauca and Nariño, with proximity to
areas of illicit crop harvesting, this has created a source of attraction for the labor force employed
in coffee production. Hence, illicit crops have pushed up labor scarcity and costs. To date, the
main effect of illicit crops is not coffee crop substitution but a distortion of the labor markets. In
the case of the smaller producer, whose source of labor is his own family, and whose family
income is generated not only by agricultural produce but also by wages earned outside the farm,
he is likely to benefit from this phenomenon. For the larger coffee producer, highly dependent on
wage labor this situation will increase his costs of production. Given the few cash crop
alternatives in remote rural areas, coffee is one of the few viable legal options for income but
cannot compete with higher value illicit crops.

Today, 18% of Colombia’s rural households depend directly on coffee production for income, be
it through coffee harvesting or through wage labor. Many of these employment opportunities
come from the larger coffee producers. Labor employed in the coffee sector during the last
decade has represented on average about 34% of total agricultural employment13. While at the
beginning of the 1990s coffee was responsible for about 750 thousand full jobs in coffee growing
areas (Junguito & Pizano,1991), in 2000 coffee was responsible for 515 thousand full time jobs
(Office of Advisors in Coffee Matters, 2000). The NCFG estimates that approximately 100,000
more people may lose jobs in the sector14.

Even if a few small producers have been able to partially compensate their lower income with
some illicit resources, the overall effect of lower international prices on the sector’s income has
been dramatic. As measured by the real value of the coffee crop, the coffee sector’s income has
fallen 50% during the last decade. In 2001 alone income was fully 40% less than the decade
average. As a result, coffee producers´ welfare has been severely affected, and there has been a
high human cost. Due to the reduced profitability of the coffee sector, it is estimated that the
number of households in coffee growing areas living under the poverty line rose from 54.2% to
61% between 1997 and 2000 (DANE, 2001).

12
For example, El Tiempo Feb 17, 2002 and Dec 5, 2001 had a front-page bulletin about the crisis in coffee zone
and accompanying ills of drugs, kidnapping--both precipitors and consequences of a bad situation.
13
excluding animal husbandry
14
Personal communication Diego Pizano (March 5, 2002 email commentary)

25


Chart 4A. Real Value of Harvest (in billions of pesos constant at year 2000 value)

Source: NFCG from CAIC report

4. Production Issues

For many decades Colombia's production policy emphasized relatively high volumes of
production (the world's No. 2 producer until recently) and above-average quality levels. Planted
areas increased almost 40% during the 1960s reaching an all time peak of almost 1.1 million
hectares in 1970 as measured by that year’s coffee census. From there onwards there has been a
steady decline in planted areas, so that the area estimated by the NFCG for 2002 is 805,000
hectares.

Colombia’s coffee production has reduced slightly in recent years although it has remained more
or less constant for the last 30 years while Brazil and Vietnam; the two other major world
producers have increased their production (See Chart 5).

26


Chart 5. Comparative Coffee Production

Coffee Production
40,000
(bags of 60 kg)

30,000

20,000

10,000

- 60 80 90/91 92/93 94/9
5 96/97 98/99 00/01

Brasil Colombia Vietnam

The modernization program of coffee areas launched by the NFCG and the favorable conditions
of the world coffee markets help to push physical productivity from an average of 7 bags per
hectare a year in 1970 to 12.9 in 1982. However, from the early 1980s it has remained more or
less constant in values averaging between 12 and 14 coffee bags per hectare with some notable
rises and falls including a brief peak of more than 18 bags per hectare in 1993. In the 1990s
productivity quickly fell from the 1993 high back to below 13 bags per hectare by the late 1990s.
While this may indicate that Colombia’s coffee sector is near to its limit in terms of increases in
physical productivity, the NFCG estimates that productivity, in the mid to long-term, has a
potential of reaching 20 bags per hectare. The NFCG renovation program has been largely
responsible for recent increases in these averages since the year 2000. In 2002 productivity levels
reached 13.7 bags per hectare and 2003 projections are for 14 bags with modest and steady
increases over the next few years due primarily to the amount of new trees coming into full
production.

Although the great 1970's effort of modernization significantly improved coffee production and
productivity, the overall structure of coffee production has otherwise remained mostly
unchanged except for a clear reduction in planted areas. Labor productivity, for example has
improved only marginally in the last 30 years. While productivity is certainly important from an
economic standpoint, other production factors such as differentiation/specialization or high-
quality orientation may be equally valid and worthy of consideration. Colombian coffee growers
face a complex scenario nationally and internationally, which nonetheless offers them several
profitable alternatives. Some growers will need to depart somewhat from the commodity
production mentality and start evaluating, with the available institutional support, the alternatives
open to them according to their particular interests and possibilities. However, to aid them in

27


taking appropriate decisions, certain institutional aspects of production need to be addressed and
made available to the coffee producing sector.

Planting materials
Disease resistant and more productive coffee varietals are necessary to ensure the long-term
competitiveness of Colombia’s farmers. Cenicafé should be encouraged to continue research on
commercial varieties that are capable of reducing cultivation labor and protecting the
environment from unnecessary use of agrochemicals. The NFCG has a program designed to
renovate 70,000 hectares a year with young trees. Approximately 35% of these hectares under
renovation are planted with new trees resistant to coffee leaf rust: ‘Variedad Colombia’.
However, questions have been raised about the quality control system to ensure their resistant
advantages and these must be appropriately addressed by CENICAFE and the NFCG’s own
quality assurance systems.

Fertilizers
For many years the NFCG subsidized the use of fertilizers, perhaps unsustainably since the real
beneficiaries in some cases may have been crops other than coffee. A promising soil
conservation program that appeared effective and had long-term sustainability was unfortunately
stopped because of the FNC’s financial crisis.

Integrated soil conservation can significantly reduce the need for all externally purchased inputs
and therefore reduce farmers’ exposure to financial risk incurred when borrowing or spending
cash for synthetic agrochemicals. Coffee soil in Colombia, with its high volcanic ash content, is
very fragile and easily erodible. A comprehensive soil conservation program should include
policies aimed at reducing trees’ age, stimulating use of shade trees and wind barriers (where
appropriate), introducing leguminous soil coverings, planting of associated crops, and avoiding
the indiscriminate use of insecticides and fungicides. To preserve and increase the soil’s natural
microorganisms, some synthetic fertilizers should be substituted with organic material such as
compost, coffee pulp, and other green fertilizers. These simple organically-oriented methods,
familiar to CENICAFE, have not been emphasized as much as the more technologically oriented
approaches.

Productivity
Since the 1970s Colombia implemented an active coffee production policy whose main objective
was to increase physical productivity in coffee plantations; this was to be brought about
primarily by promoting highly productive coffee varieties with corresponding agrochemical
inputs and increasing plantation densities. This proved to be a rather successful policy while the
economic clauses (quotas) of the International Coffee Agreement lasted and Colombia’s rural
labor market had an oversupply of workers on offer. However, these and other variables have
changed to warrant a new consideration of this strategy.

Colombia’s cost of rural labor has increased over time, in part due to the ongoing conflict in rural
areas causing a shortage of labor supply. This of course affects coffee’s costs of production,
especially those of the highly productive farms which are intensive in wage labor. Labor costs

28


amount to between 70% and 80% of final production costs. The rise in labor costs has not been
offset by a corresponding increase in labor productivity; hence coffee’s higher physical
productivities may be producing an adverse effect in its cost structure especially under the
present scenario of relatively low world coffee prices.

Decades of promoting higher physical productivities may also have helped to produce
environmental stress, in terms of deforestation, water contamination, loss of the soil fertility and
reduction of biodiversity. These negative externalities today may be obstacles for the
development of certain differentiated and specialty coffee such as organic, and therefore a
consistent policy to develop more environmentally-friendly types of coffee will be needed to
address them.

As shown in Chart 6 Colombia’s coffee production exhibited a constant annual production of
around 8.7 million coffee bags up until the mid 70s, when it started increasing, most certainly as
an effect of the process of modernization, until it reached an average annual level of 11.5 million
coffee bags for the remaining part of the century. The observed peak in 1992 of 18 million coffee
bags was due to a combination of favorable conditions which have not repeated themselves since
then. The average annual production over the last five years has been approximately 10.8 million
bags in part as an effect of the recent efforts to recover productivity through the renovation
program.

Chart 6

1,100,000 20

1,000,000 16

900,000 12
bags
has

800,000 8

700,000 4

600,000 0
2002e
1961
1964
1967
1970
1973
1976
1979
1982
1985
1988
1991
1994
1997
2000

Area Production (mil.bags) Productivity (bags/ha)

Source: NFCG

29


In 1998 the NFCG launched a renovation
program targeted to lower the overall NFCG:Renovation Program of Coffee
average age of planted trees to between 5 Trees 1998-2002
and 5.5 years of age. This was to be brought
about by subsidizing the yearly renovation Renovated
Years
of approximately 70,000 hectares, starting in Hectares
1998. Coffee plots under renovation have no 1998 62.842
meaningful production in the first two years, 1999 73.217
begin producing on the third and reach a 2000 60.400
peak on the fifth. The following data in 2001 43.000
Table 3 reflects the renovation program’s 2002 (*) 60.000
results. (*) Estimated
Table 3 Source: NFCG
One of the critical variables limiting
increases in physical productivity is the cost
of labor because of the fact that increases in productivity demand similar increases in labor that
therefore offset income gains due to greater production. Small coffee growers (plots under 5
hectares) disguise this fact by employing family labor. As will be discussed more extensively in
section 11 (Viable Coffee Production Systems in a Low Price Scenario), employment of non-
wage labor by these farmers results in that their actual production costs are under 0.45
US$/pound15. Medium and large producers (coffee plots bigger than 5 hectares) have production
costs of over US$0.53/pound16 and the difference in costs are primarily explained by the fact that
95% of their labor needs medium and large producers are met by wage labor.

The NFCG’s own assessments indicate that there is room to increase the output per ha. about
100% in some areas and that a 20% further reduction in average costs of production is possible.
Increasing output productivity is certainly welcome but the methods must be well considered
given the potential negative environmental externalities of intensified production and that an
increase in physical productivity is not necessarily followed by an increase in profitability.

With world prices for Colombian coffee at below 0.70 US$/pound, profitability in coffee
production for medium and big producers is too low to be attractive for investment. Therefore
any proposed intensification of production can have the following shortcomings which have to
be addressed in order to design a consistent and realistic production policy:

Produces an increase on demand for manual labor thereby potentially narrowing
profitability even further for the medium and large coffee producers.
Care for coffee quality –one of Colombia’s comparative advantage– requires a careful
process of selection before and during harvesting which depends on manual labor and
adequate infrastructure, and is difficult to control whenever harvests come in great
volumes and in short periods of time, as is the case in intensive plantations.

15
Equivalent to Col$1.760 per kg
16
Equivalent to Col$2.080 per kg

30


Colombia’s topography does not permit mechanization alternatives.
Usually small producers are averse to radical technological changes in the production
chain17 in cases where there are viable alternatives or additional investments are required.
Coffee profits are sensitive to variations in international coffee prices. In view of this,
intensification is a high-risk decision where losses can be of considerable proportions.
Production in intensively cultivated farms is cyclic and regular, but as a monocrop is
highly sensitive to climatic and environmental conditions.
Coffee in Colombia is an exotic crop, as densities increase it is more pest susceptible.
Two of coffee’s most notable pests, –namely coffee leaf rust which arrived in 1983, and
the coffee berry borer which arrived in 1988– in the absence of resistant coffee varietals
are more easily controlled under low plant densities.

Production quality
Quality begins in the field with good agronomic practices and requires well-managed harvest and
post-harvest processes. Colombia, as a quality leader, has initiated a number of such programs
over the years. Now, as its position has eroded, more quality and market-oriented interventions
are necessary in order to elevate Colombian coffee’s market advantage. This is especially true as
most other producers also rush to invest heavily in quality. Among the potential areas of
production oriented focus are:

Improving the age, variety, and quality of the tree stock
considering the selective development and promotion of high-value heirloom varieties in
appropriate smallholder growing areas.
Offer options for high-value green production technologies i.e. organic and shade-grown
Introducing more quality promotion techniques i.e. cupping labs in rural areas, quality
competitions like Cup of Excellence events
increased promotion of coffees from specific Geographic Indications of Origin that can
promote superior quality

5. Production Systems Costs

Colombia’s coffee growing area is located along the Andes mountain range and in the Sierra
Nevada’s foothills; it is planted between 1000 meters and 2100 meters above sea level. However,
the social and economic structures affecting coffee production in the different coffee regions, as
well as their variance in environmental conditions (soil quality, water supply and sunlight), have

17
It should be noted that there is evidence that Colombia's smallholders, perhaps because of 70 years of organized
extension services and notable successes, are less resistant to radical change than in many other countries.

31


resulted in production models with quite different resources. Under present market conditions
data from these allows us to arrive at some conclusions as to the future of the regions as coffee
producing areas.

In order to examine this regional effect the Center for Regional Studies in Coffee and Managerial
Studies (CRECE) conducted a study which classified coffee production models by region and
analyzed how they were facing present production conditions in the contxt of a low cost
environment (CRECE, 2001). Even though this resulting regionalization is too aggregated to
capture important internal differences it is a reasonable approximation and the only analysis
currently available. Their regional classification was as follows: Central-Western Region,
comprising the departments of Antioquia, Caldas, Quindío, Risaralda, Tolima and Valle; Eastern
Region, comprising the departments of Boyacá, Cundinamarca, Norte de Santander and
Santander; Southern Region, comprising the departments of Cauca, Nariño and Huila; and
Northern Region, comprising the departments of Cesar, La Guajira and Magdalena. Table 3
shows distribution of coffee planted area and production according to these regional
classifications Central Western and Southern regions represent 79% of total planted area and
contribute with 88% of production.

Table 11.
Distribution of coffee production and planted area by region
Region Planted Area Coffee Prodruction
Central Western 61% 75%
Southern 18% 13%
Eastern 16% 9%
Northern 5% 3%

Source: CRECE

For the purposes of this analysis regions were characterized mainly according to production
technology and farm sizes.

From the point of view of coffee growing technology, production in Colombia can be classified
as: 1) modern sun exposed plantations, 2) modern tree shaded plantations and 3) traditional rustic
plantations. The term modern sun exposed refers to high density plantations (average densities of
5,100 trees per hectare), with young highly productive trees, whose care practices are labor
intensive and require high doses of agrochemical inputs resulting in high cost structures. Modern
tree shaded plantations have an average density of 4,300 coffee plants per hectare, and on the
whole demand less inputs (labor and agrochemicals) because of their shade and lower plant
densities. These are less productive but their production costs are also lower. Finally traditional
plantations have average coffee plant densities of 1,800 trees per hectare, are shaded by diverse
forest canopies, use minimal inputs, and have the lowest cost structures.

Table 12 shows distribution of planted area according to technology. Around 75% of coffee
planted area in both Central Western and Southern regions correspond to modern technologies –
sun exposed and tree shaded– while in the Eastern region this percentage is just 50% of total
area and in the Northern only 20%. Traditional technologies cover 50% of coffee area in the

32


Eastern region and 80% in the northern region. Thus technology separates Central-Western and
Southern regions from the other two, the first ones having a much more modern outlook while
the other two, and especially the Northern region are predominantly traditional.

Table 12.

As shown in Table 13, modern technologies contribute with 81% of total Colombian production,

Distribution of coffee planted areas by region and production
technology
Region Technology
Sun Expo. Tree Shaded Traditional
Cent. Western 41,1% 35,6% 23,3%

Southern 35,1% 38,6% 26,3%
Eastern 9,1% 40,9% 50,0%
Northern 3,3% 16,7%

Total 32,9% 36,1% 31,0%
Source: CRECE

and in Central-Western and Southern regions these technologies respectively produce 85.5% and
81.7% of total regional production. In the Eastern region this percentage is 63%. and in the
Northern it is just 28.5%.

Table 13.
Distribution of coffee production by coffee growing technology and
region
Region Technology
Sun Expo. Tree Shaded Traditional
Cent. Western 49,8% 35,7% 14,5%
Southern 42,4% 39,3% 18,3%
Eastern 13,0% 50,1% 36,9%
Northern 5,1% 23,4% 71,5%

Total 44,3% 37,1% 18,6%
Source: CRECE

When analyzing costs the size distribution of coffee farms becomes important due primarily to
the savings which smaller farms can obtain from non-wage family labor. Table 14 shows
distribution of coffee farms according to size and region. Small farms (between 0.1 and 3
hectares) are predominant in the Southern and Central-Western regions representing 62.7% and
54% of all coffee farms respectively. In the Eastern these size farms represent 44.5% and in the
Northern just 5.8%. Thus coffee growing areas in Southern and Central-Western regions are

33

COLOMBIA COFFEE SECTOR STUDY

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